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How should judges decide commercial cases, in particular, contract
cases?
Amicus Curiae Issue 84 Winter 2010
4
CONTRACT IN ACTION
This question received a powerful impetus with the
publication of Stewart Macaulay’s pioneering study in
1963 into the use of contract law in the market place.
Macaulay looked at the contracting practices of businesses
in Wisconsin and found that many entered into agreements
that didn’t satisfy the requirements of contract law and
would not, therefore, be enforceable in the courts – and
that the parties did not seem to care about this lack of
enforceability. He also found that business people used a
variety of non-legal methods, primarily trust and gossip, to
ensure performance of their transactions. In addition he
discovered that often contracts were written up for
internal bureaucratic needs such as controlling sales people
or acting as records for production purposes. Indeed, he
found that many business people actively disliked the law
and preferred to avoid its use wherever possible.
His work provoked an avalanche of studies, historical
and contemporary, which showed that contract law seemed
to be an unimportant and often unwanted aspect of
commercial activities. Studies of medieval Jewish traders in
Muslim North Africa and American traders in Mexican
California showed flourishing trading networks that
worked without the use of contract law and enforcement
by the courts. In fact the New York Stock Exchange’s first
50 years were marked by trading that was unenforceable in
the courts, yet this did not faze the traders. Much of
modern day commerce seems also to get on without
recourse to contract law or to the courts. Studies ranging
across diamond traders in New York, the US cotton and
chemical industries as well as whole swathes of commerce
associated with railway transportation, show business
people either transacting without using enforceable
contracts or deciding not to use the legal system at all and
relying on of industry created private legal systems instead.
For some of these merchants contract law was not used
because it was not available or it was ineffective. For others
it was a matter of choice – contract law was not used
because of its costs or because there were alternatives
which worked better. Among these alternatives were trust,
where traders felt comfortable enough with their fellow
traders to not feel the necessity for a state enforced
contract, and reputation, where traders were able to rely
on gossip to police transactions and ensure performance.
Some industries have gone further and created their own
private legal systems to enforce their transactions.
Reading these numerous studies might tempt one to
think that contract law is unnecessary and that business
would get on well without it. But, of course, contract cases
do reach the courts and businesses do pay expensive
lawyers to draw up contracts. Since business people are not
in the habit of subsidizing others’ lifestyles, contract law
must play some part in commerce. The difficulty is
determining exactly what part it should play.
Of one thing we can be certain. Given the ubiquity of
studies showing the non-use of law it seems that the
common belief that transacting in the market takes place in
the “shadow of the law” – that parties know that the law
will be rarely invoked but that all transactions are
completed in forms that could be argued in the courts– is
simply not true. Rather, it appears that contract law is used
in commerce but in special circumstances and for
particular purposes. Instead of acting as a template for all
transacting, contracts and contract law are used depending
on the type of transaction and the type of industry
involved.
Barak Richman has analysed the various forces operating
in a transacting environment and suggested that transacting
parties have three options in ensuring that transactions go
ahead. According to Richman, the choice of option is a
matter of cost and the type of industry in question. One
option is vertical integration where a company, for
example, buys a supplier to ensure that it gets the parts or
resources necessary for its business to continue. This will
not be considered further because this is a matter for
corporate law and government regulation and not contract
law. A second option, as was shown by Macaulay and
others, is trust and reputation-based enforcement. Again,
this will not be considered further as these mechanisms lie
in the realm of industrial sociology and government
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industry policy. The remaining option is, of course, the law
of contract. For some industries the law is either the only
option available or it is used when it suits. So, while the law
of contract might not be the most important mechanism
for policing transactions it is used and requires analysis. It
is this option that will be discussed here.
WHEN IS CONTRACT USED?
The first question then that arises from Macaulay’s work
is: when contract law is an option open to the transacting
parties, under what circumstances is it likely to be used?
Hugh Collins has provided an interesting framework for
analysing when commercial actors will and will not use the
law of contract. He distinguishes three aspects of
commercial transacting. The first, the economic deal,
concerns a particular, discrete transaction. Use of the law
here will depend on how important the transaction is. The
second aspect of most transactions is the relationship
between the parties. Most commercial actors deal in a
series of transactions so that any particular transaction is
worth less than the totality of potential transactions in the
future. The third aspect is the contract itself which
embodies the legal relationship between the parties. For
Collins it is normally the business relationship that is the
most important aspect of transacting, but in particular
circumstances either the deal or the legally enforceable
contract can assume first rank importance. For Collins
while the law is potentially there to be used it is normally
dormant, with the other aspects dominating the
relationship between the parties. In other words, when
parties enter into contracts they are not normally guiding
their behaviour around a legal framework but, instead, are
usually concentrating on building and maintaining a
business relationship and ensuring that particular
transactions are profitable. Contract law is an exceptional,
but powerful, tool to be used when it is needed.
RESPONSES – CONTEXTUALISM AND
FORMALISM
Having spelt out predictive tools about when and how
contract law will be used leads to the second major issue
facing legal scholars and judges. What should be the
response of contract law to this third category of
transacting where the law is there potentially to be used
even if not used often? There are two major responses to
this question, and they will be outlined below and their
respective strengths and weaknesses discussed.
The first, which goes under various names such as anti-
formalism or dynamic market-individualism or
contextualism, argues that the judges in deciding contract
disputes and developing the law should give effect to the
expectations, practices and desires of the business
community. A contextualist law of contract would give
primacy to standards such as good faith and
unconscionability and look to business norms and
practices to interpret contracts and to fill gaps where
necessary. As Roger Brownsword describes it, such a law
would be dynamic because it would be continually refined
to give effect to changing business norms, expectations and
behaviour.
The alternative response which, for ease of exposition
we can call formalism, argues that since business uses law
selectively, ie when the law suits its purposes, it would be
counterproductive if the law were anything other than
predictable. In other words, if the law is continually
changing to match perceived notions of business needs or
expectations (perceptions that at best can only be rough
and ready approximations of these needs and expectations)
the law would be unpredictable and not a useful tool for
these businesspeople. Formalism eschews open-ended
concepts such as good faith and relies on bright-line rules
and strict limits on judicial discretion.
So, which style should judges employ in deciding
commercial contract disputes? The problems facing a
contextualist strategy seem daunting. First, this strategy
depends on judges having sufficient information to make
sure that both their decisions and the resulting
developments of the law match precisely the needs of
commerce. This means that accurate information about
customary practices and expectations in particular
industries as well as accurate information about particular
transactions – all central to Collins’s understanding of
contextualist judging – have to be available to judges. But,
of course, this is not going to be the case. Studies about
particular industries are rare and liable to date very quickly.
In the absence of timely studies will parties wait until a
study is carried out, a process that might take a year or
more? And who would pay for this study, the parties or the
courts? In times of regular complaints that the courts are
being starved for funds it is unlikely that governments
would supply the money. Would the parties want to pay?
If we hold aside the question whether this sort of
information exists in a readily usable form, one can also ask
whether it would be likely that business people would want
information about prices and short term and long term
business strategies to become publicly available.
Confidentiality lies at the heart of much business activity
yet it is this sort of information upon which Collins bases
his whole strategy.
Secondly, contextualism overestimates the capacity of
judges and imposes on them a task which is beyond their
abilities and training. Judges are practising lawyers, not
practising market players. So, even if the market
information that contextualism depends upon were
available and inexpensive, there is no guarantee that the
judges would be able to master this information to make
decisions that conform to business practices and
expectations. For example, in a study of the US Uniform
Commercial Code, Richard Danzig has shown that where
the Code requires judges to apply business custom in
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settling disputes what has actually happened is that judges
have imposed their own values in the guise of applying
business custom. In separate work both Roger
Brownsword and Catherine Mitchell have shown that, in
practice, a requirement for judges to apply reasonable
expectations in deciding contract disputes inevitably
morphs into an application of the judges’ own values.
Thirdly, contextualism ignores the realities of power in
the business environment. Any strategy which relies on
litigation as a source for the development of law leaves
itself open to being manipulated by repeat players. Repeat
players are litigants who either because of greater resources
or greater knowledge can and will use the courts
strategically. As Marc Galanter showed many years ago
repeat players are able to disproportionately influence the
development of the law. Proponents of contextualism seem
to ignore this dark side of litigation. Similarly,
contextualists ignore the possibility that business norms
reflect the values and customs of the more powerful.
Would it be surprising that in an industry dominated by a
few large corporations the ordinary customs surrounding
exchange reflect the wishes and practices of these large
market players? If this is the case, contextualism’s strategy
of converting market practices into law would only further
cement the advantages held by these companies. In a
similar way Collins’s call for judges to give effect to the
particular business relationship between two trading
partners runs the risk that it would cement in law the
imbalance of power embodied in the transaction between
the parties.
But the most damning criticism of contextualism is that
it will run against the interests of those it is aiming to help
– market transactors. In very simple terms if, as Collins so
persuasively argues, market participants use law selectively
when it suits their purposes, predictability and certainty
will be central to their requirements. A continually
changing law which aims to track changing business needs,
behaviour and expectations can only be unpredictable and,
hence, unattractive to market players. All these problems
suggest that contextualism will result in sub-optimal
changes to the law. In general terms, then, it is unlikely that
contextualism is a strategy that works to the benefit of
market transactors.
In addition to these general concerns about the
contextualist strategy, several scholars have suggested that
contextualism raises specific problems for the market. Lisa
Bernstein has argued that transactors value the possibility
of waiving contractual rights at particular times in a
particular business relationship while still wishing to
reserve the right to enforce such rights in the case of future
breaches (where, for example, the breach is seen as
opportunistic rather than accidental or as being beyond the
control of the other contracting party). If the judges
misinterpreted the business relationship and accorded a
conditional waiver the status of custom within that
particular relationship the innocent party would be
hesitant to waive accidental breaches in the future with this
or any other transacting partner for fear that such a wavier
would become legally entrenched. Bernstein’s rigidity
thesis has an intuitive appeal. If she is correct
contextualism would make transacting less rather than
more flexible and this would hardly add to business
efficiency. Catherine Mitchell’s analysis of entire contract
clauses shows that even where parties embody in their
contracts a desire to ensure that their agreement be treated
formally a contextualist judge might set this wish aside and
consider factors outside the written terms of the contract.
Once a judge has acquired a taste for contextualist judging
it is likely that even the parties’ own request that their
particular contract be treated in a formalist fashion might
be ignored. Again, one has to ask how such a judicial
response would aid market efficiency.
From one perspective the strengths of the formalist
approach are the reverse of the weaknesses of
contextualism. These weaknesses by themselves provide a
strong argument in favour of formalism. But there are
positive arguments as well.
First, as suggested above formalism supports party
autonomy by giving the contracting parties maximum
flexibility in deciding when and where to enforce their
contractual rights. The predictability of a formal regime
means that parties can plan around the law and have it in
reserve if they choose to use it. The unpredictability of a
contextualist regime reduces the parties’ flexibility by
introducing uncertainty about the ability of the parties to
enforce those rights. In a nice irony, a formal and
predictable law is more likely to be contextually aligned to
the market and its practices.
Second, there is significant evidence that formalism is
the preferred option of market players. Bernstein’s study
of private legal systems shows that these systems eschew
contextualism in favour of bright line rules and formalist
adjudication. When given the opportunity to design their
own legal regimes, sophisticated traders rely on formalism
as the preferred legal strategy. Recent studies by Eisenberg
and Miller of publicly listed contracts containing choice of
law and choice of forum clauses in the United States show
that market participants tend to choose those states whose
courts and law are formalist in nature and practice over
those jurisdictions which are more contextualist. This
shows that, given a choice, market traders seem to choose
formal legal regimes over contextualist ones.
On purely intellectual terms, then, formalism seems a
more convincing option than contextualism. But it is also
probably true to say that, at least in the United Kingdom
and Australia, contextualism is in the ascendant.
Surprisingly, there is evidence of retreat from
contextualism in the United States. The home of good
faith has seen the attacks on this doctrine bear fruit as
more and more judges accept the formalist arguments
against a broad ranging doctrine of good faith.
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COMMON LAW CONTRACT AND THE
MARKET
Viewed from a wider perspective, however, one can
argue that despite their conflicting approaches to law,
formalism and contextualism share some basic
assumptions. Both see the underlying role of law as being
to support and, if possible, enhance market transacting by
shaping law to suit market needs. In furtherance of this
goal both are willing to change the law to better suit market
transacting. Of course, the amount and nature of change
differs. As we have seen, contextualists such as
Brownsword and Collins envisage a dynamic, ever changing
law that continually adapts to suit changing business needs,
behaviour and expectations. Formalism by its very nature
eschews dynamic change but because of its commitment to
the market, leading formalists have argued for one off
adjustments to tidy up annoying or dysfunctional (from the
market’s perspective) rules. Scott and Schwartz have made
such a proposal, listing a series of small but significant
changes that would make contract law even more attractive
to the market. Formalists owe no allegiance to the
common law of contract but only to the best formalist
regime that they can create.
Not only do both formalists and contextualists see the
role of contract law as being an aid to market transacting,
they also share an indifference to the common law of
contract. Clearly contextualists who favour a dynamic
contract law owing its dynamism to the market and its
perceived needs cannot be said to have any fidelity to the
common law. But formalists too base their preferred
model of law, in their case predictable rules applied in a
formalistic manner, on the needs of the market. In other
words contextualism and formalism present an example of
strategic congruence – seeing the law as a tool for the
market – and tactical divergence – diametrically opposed
views on how to achieve this goal. Neither displays any
commitment to the common law and given their shared
assumption that the role of contract law is to aid market
transacting this should not be surprising.
This raises the third major issue that comes out of the
responses to Macaulay’s findings. Even if one accepts that
formalism is more likely to suit the needs of the market
should we understand contract law as primarily a tool to
aid market transacting? I think not for three, interlocking
reasons which I label as constitutional, historical and
institutional.
The common law of contract is part and parcel of the
common law which was developed in the United Kingdom
and inherited and further developed in the United States
and Australia, among other countries. The latter two have
a written constitution but, of course, both constitutions
presuppose and are reliant on the common law as a
foundation of their respective constitutional structures.
The common law is judge-made law and its development
has always been distinctively legal. The common law has
grown by judges developing the common law rules that
they have inherited using what is commonly called legal
reasoning. While there is justified debate about how insular
this reasoning is and how much it is affected by
instrumental concerns arising out of politics, economics
and social forces and ideas, in the common law rules have
an identifiable legal basis. If, however, the development of
the common law of contract were to be purely driven by an
instrumentalist desire to make the law reflect the practices,
needs and expectations of the business community a
fundamental constitutional barrier would be crossed.
Instead of change and development in the law being driven
by the legal reasoning of professional judges it would,
instead, reflect the needs and desires of the market. I think
that such a move would be illegitimate and
unconstitutional.
The constitutional aspect of the law of contract relates
mainly to legitimacy. Another way of looking at contract is
historical. The common law of contract had a long
gestation in the common law but on even the most
conservative view it is over 400 years old. An institution of
this heritage is worthy of respect on its own terms. Perhaps
such an argument is too Burkean for modern tastes but
surely such an institutional heritage merits caution when
presented with a challenge, and contextualism most
certainly provides a fundamental challenge to the
historically developed law of contract. Longevity and
tradition should not be overridden too easily.
Finally there is an institutional aspect to this question.
Contextualism in essence amounts to sub-contracting
development in the law of contract to the marketplace.
Although the judges will be the formal agents of change, a
truly dynamic contextualist law of contract will ultimately
amount to the source of legal change being the needs,
behaviour and expectations of the market, not the legal
products of a process of professional legal reasoning. But,
of course, if this change were to occur the same judges who
would decide contract cases instrumentally would also be
deciding cases in other areas of law. Could they quarantine
contract from other areas or would there be irresistible
pressure to replicate what was happening in contract in
other areas of the law? For example, would tax cases be
decided by interpreting tax legislation in light of the
behaviour or desires of taxpayers or the taxation authorities
(or a mixture of both)? Would criminal law be developed
in line with the expectations of the general public, the
police, criminals or politicians? It is difficult to believe that
judges could be schizophrenic and it is much more likely
that instrumentalism would ultimately come to dominate
other areas of law as well.
Of course this discussion is premised on the notion that
common law judging is an independent, professional form
of legal reasoning and not instrumentally focussed on
delivering particular social, economic or political
outcomes. Or, in other words, that judging in the common
law is legal rather than political. It is no secret that for
many, perhaps most, legal scholars it is extremely
unfashionable to see legal reasoning and judging as
anything other than instrumental and many judges,
especially in the United States, agree with this
understanding of the judicial role. If this view is correct or
becomes the majority view (which amounts to the same
thing) this concern with the integrity and continued
existence of traditional common law contract becomes
irrelevant. If the common law is just another governmental
or regulatory tool, the common belief of the formalists and
contextualists makes perfect sense and the only real
question remaining then is not the goal, which is common
to both, but the tactics to be chosen, which of course is the
bone of contention between the two groups.
CONCLUSION
Much contract law scholarship today is doctrinal,
concentrating on the way in which judges develop and
apply the plethora of rules and principles that make up the
common law of contract. I think that this is an appropriate
endeavour. But, given the evidence that contract law is not
much used in the marketplace and given the intuitive
attractiveness of the contextualist approach – if the law is
not being used much let’s make it more attractive to
market players – doctrinal scholars cannot just keep doing
what they do. They also need to justify what they do by
showing that there are very good reasons, constitutional,
historical and institutional, for continuing traditional
black-letter, doctrinal scholarship. Otherwise they might
find that no one, especially the judges, is listening any
more.
John Gava
Reader, Adelaide Law School
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